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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 25, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.1  It reversed the 
decisions of four lower courts, all of which had concluded that an 
Indian tribal court had jurisdiction over a non-member defendant.2  
In doing so, the Supreme Court further modified the federal 
common law of tribal court jurisdiction and provided further 
clarification regarding the general tribal jurisdiction rule and its two 
exceptions first established in Montana v. United States.3   
The legal evolution of Indian tribal sovereignty has moved in 
contradictory directions at different points in U.S. history.  The result 
is that predicting whether, and when, tribal courts have authority can 
be difficult, particularly when it comes to people or entities that are 
not tribal members.  This can be particularly problematic when non-
members and members do business together.  The lack of certainty 
regarding the applicable law or applicable forum can add transaction 
costs to already expensive economic disputes.   
This article will discuss the facts that gave rise to the Plains Com-
merce Bank case, the development of the Montana rule and its excep-
tions, and the Supreme Court’s holding in Plains Commerce Bank as 
well as its implications for tribal jurisdiction. 
II. FACTS 
Plains Commerce Bank essentially involved a lending relationship 
that went awry.4  While the dispute ended up being litigated in tribal 
court, the nagging question throughout the case, which required a 
decision from the Supreme Court to resolve, was whether the tribal 
court had jurisdiction to litigate the dispute.5  The intricacies of the 
facts foreshadow the difficulty in answering this question.   
A. The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation  
At one time, the Sioux Tribes claimed a large part of the Dakotas 
as their own.6  But treaties, Congressional divestiture, land allotments, 
 
 1. 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).   
 2. Id at 2716. 
 3. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).   
 4. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2714. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 682 (1993); Solem v. Bartlett, 
465 U.S. 463, 468–69 (1984).   
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and sales significantly diminished the Sioux Tribe’s land.7  The Fort 
Laramie Treaty of 1868 established the now defunct Great Sioux 
Reservation, consisting of more than sixty-million acres, principally in 
western South Dakota and southwestern North Dakota.8  The Indian 
General Allotment Act of 1887, however, provided for diminishment 
of this reservation by enabling non-Indians to acquire fee title to 
“surplus” land on the reservation.9  In 1889, Congress replaced the 
Great Sioux Reservation with a number of smaller reservations, which 
included the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation (the Reservation).10   
The boundaries of the Reservation encompass large areas of De-
wey and Ziebach counties in north-central South Dakota.11  Further 
sales and transfers of individually- and tribally-owned lands within the 
Reservation occurred when Congress later opened up 1.6 million 
acres of land within Reservation boundaries for homesteading by non-
Indians.12  Today, non-Indians own substantial land within Reservation 
boundaries, including the land at issue in this case. 
B. The Parties 
Plains Commerce Bank (the Bank) is a South Dakota banking 
corporation.13  It has a branch in Hoven, South Dakota, which is 
located near but not on the Reservation.14  The Long Family Land and 
Cattle Company (the Long Company), on the other hand, is a South 
Dakota ranching and farming corporation located on the Reserva-
tion.15  The Long Company was incorporated on March 24, 1987.16  
Shortly thereafter, the Indian-owned Long Company, which was 
eligible for Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) guaranteed loans pursuant 
to 25 C.F.R. § 103.25, began lending relations with the Bank.17  
Cheyenne River Sioux tribal members Ronnie Long and his wife, Lila 
 
 7. See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 682; Solem, 465 U.S. at 468–69. 
 8. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 art. 2, 15 Stat. 635. 
 9. Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).   
 10. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 682. 
 11. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 
2715 (2008). 
 12. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (1908). 
 13. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 2714. 
 16. South Dakota Secretary of State, Business Services, http://apps.sd.gov/
applications/st32cprs/AllDocuments.aspx? &BID=DF026227 (last visited Nov. 2, 
2009). 
 17. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2728 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 103.25) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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Long, (the Longs) have a majority shareholder interest in the Long 
Company.  
C. The Land 
The primary collateral underlying the loan arrangements be-
tween the Bank and the Long Company consisted of approximately 
2230 acres of pasture and farm land on the Reservation in Dewey 
County, South Dakota, and a home in Timber Lake, South Dakota.18  
Kenneth Long, Ronnie Long’s father, and a non-tribal member, 
owned this property in fee status before his death.19  In 1992, Kenneth 
Long mortgaged this property to the Bank as security for the Long 
Company’s debt.20   
Kenneth Long died on July 17, 1995.21  On September 26, 1995, 
the Bank filed a creditor’s claim against the estate for the Long 
Company’s debts; demanding $750,000.22  In lieu of foreclosure, 
Kenneth Long’s second wife, Paulette Long, provided a personal 
representative’s deed for the real estate and home in Timber Lake to 
the Bank.23   
D.  The Contracts 
The Bank and the Long Company then entered into two con-
tracts: a loan agreement and a lease with option to purchase.24  The 
parties entered into the loan agreement on December 5, 1996.25  
Under the terms of the loan agreement, the Bank credited the Long 
Company debt for the farm real estate, and the home in Timber Lake 
deeded to the Bank.26  The loan agreement required the Bank to 
request that the BIA increase the guarantee on one outstanding Long 
Company loan from 84% to 90%, and to reschedule payment of the 
delinquent note over twenty years.27  The Bank also was to request that 
the BIA provide a 90% guarantee for a new operating loan.28  If the 
 
 18. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 
1070, 1073 (D.S.D. 2006). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715. 
 21. Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1073. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1073–74. 
 25. Id. at 1074. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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BIA guarantee requests were approved, the Bank was to make an 
additional loan of $53,500 to the Long Company.29  The parties also 
entered into a two-year lease with the option to purchase the pasture 
farm real estate o5n December 5, 1996.  The option price was 
$468,000.30   
E. The Relationship 
By letter dated December 12, 1996, the Bank claimed that it ful-
filled its obligation to request the agreed BIA guarantees.31  During 
the winter, while the BIA request was pending, the Bank issued loans 
to the Long Company totaling approximately $24,000.32  The BIA 
provided no response until February 14, 1997, when it rejected the 
Bank’s application as incomplete.33  By that time, most of the cattle 
the Long Company had proposed to use as collateral for the loans 
had perished in harsh winter conditions.34  Because the BIA rejected 
the application, and the contemplated loan could no longer be 
sufficiently collateralized, the Bank did not make the loan. It did, 
however, provide subsequent additional financing.35  
The Long Company failed to exercise its option to purchase the 
farm real estate in December 1998.36  On March 17, 1999, with the 
Long Company still in possession of approximately 960 acres, the 
Bank sold 320 acres of pasture land to Ralph and Norma Pesicka, who 
are not members of the tribe.37  The Pesickas paid $49,600 in cash for 
the land, or $155 per acre.38  Edward and Mary Maciejewski, who are 
not members of the tribe, purchased the remaining 1905 acres from 
the Bank for $401,100 under a contract for deed on June 29, 1999.39  
The Maciejewskis paid approximately $210 per acre for the remaining 
pasture and farm land.  The Long Company remained in possession 
of 960 acres.40   
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1073–74. 
 31. Id. at 1074.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Joint App. at 141–43, Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No. 07-
411), 2008 WL 467351. 
 39. Id. at 148–57. 
 40. Aff. of Charles Simon, Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d (D.S.D. 2006) 
(No. CIV 05-3002) (on file with District of South Dakota) 
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Together, the Maciejewskis and the Pesickas paid approximately 
$450,700 for the part of the property they acquired.  According to the 
terms of the option to purchase, if the Long Company had exercised 
the option for $468,000, it would have been reduced to a net cost of 
$443,600.41 
F.  The Tribal Courts 
The Long Company continued in possession of 960 acres of the 
property following the expiration of the lease.  Therefore, the Bank 
sought to serve a Notice to Quit on the Long Company as a prerequi-
site to the action for forcible entry and detainer it filed in South 
Dakota state court.42  Because off-reservation process servers cannot 
effectuate valid service on the Reservation, the Bank sent the notice to 
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court (Tribal Court) on June 15, 
1999, asking that the Tribal Court authorize service.43  The notice was 
then served by a tribal process server.44 
In response to the Bank’s Notice to Quit, Ronnie and Lila Long 
commenced the underlying Tribal Court action, seeking a temporary 
restraining order against the Bank.45  The Bank responded, denying 
Tribal Court jurisdiction and opposing entry of injunctive relief.46  
The Tribal Court upheld jurisdiction and issued a preliminary 
injunction.47   
Ronnie and Lila Long then amended their complaint, adding the 
Long Company as a plaintiff.  They asserted several causes of action, 
including breach of contract and discrimination.  The Bank answered, 
again denying Tribal Court jurisdiction.48  The Bank also filed a 
counterclaim seeking eviction of the Long Company from the 960 
acres of the farm real estate it continued to hold and damages for 
holding over under the lease.49   
A trial was held before a Tribal Court jury in Eagle Butte, South 
Dakota, on December 6 and December 11, 2002.50  In addition to the 
 
 41. Joint App., supra note 38, at 98. 
 42. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 
1070, 1074 (D.S.D. 2006). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 1075. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
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contract claim, the Longs asserted that the Bank discriminated against 
them by preventing the Long Company from exercising the option to 
purchase the leased property and for charging a higher per-acre value 
than the subsequent non-member purchasers.51  The discrimination 
claim was submitted to the jury as a claim by Ronnie and Lila Long, 
not the Long Company.52  The jury returned a general verdict 
encompassing all claims of the Longs and the Long Company against 
the Bank for $750,000 and indicated that interest should also be 
awarded.  The jury found that the Bank had discriminated against 
Ronnie Long and Lila Long.53   
On post-trial motions, the Tribal Court upheld jurisdiction over 
the Bank; ruled that federal law supported the discrimination claim; 
added pre-judgment interest to the judgment; and gave the Long 
Company an option to purchase the 960 acres it possessed by offset 
against the judgment.54   
The Bank appealed the judgment to the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribal Court of Appeals (“Tribal Court of Appeals”).  In an opinion 
dated November 22, 2004, the Tribal Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Tribal Court ruling, agreeing with the Tribe that the discrimination 
claim was based on tribal common law arising out of tribal tradition 
and custom.55  Neither party had previously argued that the discrimi-
nation claim was based upon tribal tort law.  The Tribe does not have 
a codified discrimination statute.56   
G. The Federal Courts 
The Bank then commenced a declaratory-judgment action in the 
U.S. District Court, District of South Dakota, Central Division.57  The 
Bank moved for judgment based upon the Tribal Court’s lack of 
jurisdiction, as well as the violation of its due-process rights.  The 
Longs made a cross-motion for declaratory judgment.58  The District 
Court ruled in favor of the Longs, finding that the Tribal Court had 
jurisdiction over the discrimination claim pursuant to the “consensual 
relationship” element of the first exception articulated in Montana v. 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1082. 
 56. Id. at 1081.  
 57. Id. at 1075. 
 58. Id. 
7
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United States,59 and ruled that due process was not violated.60   
The Bank appealed to United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, arguing that the District Court erred in ruling that the 
Tribal Court had jurisdiction and that the Bank was afforded due 
process.61  Specifically, the Bank challenged the District Court’s 
determination of jurisdiction based on consent and a voluntary 
consensual relationship with tribal members.62  It argued that the 
Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction over the federal claim, and that 
the after-the-fact assertion of tribal discrimination law resulted in a 
violation of the Bank’s due-process rights.63 
The Circuit Court affirmed the ruling of the District Court.64  It 
found that the Bank’s due-process rights had not been violated, and 
that the Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Bank fell 
within the inherent authority of the Tribe under the first Montana 
exception.65  According to the Circuit Court, the Bank formed a 
consensual relationship with tribal members.  Thus, the tribal tort law 
the Longs invoked was an “other means” by which a tribe may 
regulate non-member conduct.66   
The Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, 
which it granted on January 4, 2008.67  In its petition, the Bank 
explicitly declined to seek review of two arguments made below: 1) 
whether tribal courts generally lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims 
based on federal law; and 2) whether the Tribal Court’s judgment 
below should be denied comity because the Bank was denied due 
process.68   
 
 59. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1980) (“A tribe may regulate, 
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, 
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”). 
 60. Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
 61. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878, 881 
(8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the claim arose under tribal authority to regulate, and 
the Bank was not denied due process). 
 62. Id. at 884. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 892. 
 65. Id. at 888. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. 128 S. Ct. 2709 
(2008). 
 68. Id. at 2712. 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONTANA RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
Considerable legal debate has been devoted to resolving federal 
and state sovereignty issues arising out of the U.S. Constitution.  But 
on the matter of tribal sovereignty in the federal system, the Constitu-
tion does not provide much guidance.  It merely establishes that 
Congress has the power “to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian 
Tribes.”69   
It therefore fell to the courts to define the status of Indian tribes 
with respect to state and federal authority.  Three cases decided 
between 1810 and 1832, known as the Marshall trilogy, established a 
number of guiding principles that have influenced the resolution of 
tribal sovereignty questions ever since.70   
A. Pre-Montana 
In Fletcher v. Peck, the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson dis-
cussed how tribal sovereignty had been diminished by treaties.71  
Justice Johnson observed that some tribes’ sovereignty had been 
limited so that all that remained was the authority to govern people 
within the limits of their territory: “All the restrictions upon the right 
of soil in the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of all competitors 
from their markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty 
amounts to the right of governing every person within their limits 
except themselves.”72  This foreshadowed the idea that tribes inhe-
rently lacked authority over non-members.   
The development of federal common law regarding tribal sove-
reignty continued in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.73  Cherokee involved a 
challenge by the Cherokee Tribe against the State of Georgia.74  The 
tribe challenged the state’s right to pass legislation affecting the 
existence of the tribe within the state.75  Although the Court did not 
ultimately decide that issue, the opinion noted that a tribe’s relation-
ship with the United States is “marked by peculiar and cardinal 
distinctions which exist no where else.”76  The opinion coined the 
 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
 70. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).   
 71. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).  
 72. Id. at 147. 
 73. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 15. 
 76. Id. at 16. 
9
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phrasing that tribes were perhaps more properly thought of as 
“domestic dependent nations.”77  This idea was developed further by 
the Court in Worcester v. Georgia.78  Worcester involved another dispute 
between the Cherokee Tribe and the State of Georgia.79  The question 
presented in the case involved whether states had jurisdiction to pass 
laws that would infringe on tribal sovereignty.80   
Worcester noted that by virtue of aboriginal political and territorial 
status, tribes possessed certain incidents of preexisting sovereignty.81  
These vestiges of sovereignty were subject to diminution or elimina-
tion by the United States, but not by the states.82  It is this limited 
inherent sovereignty and corresponding dependency upon United 
States for protection that imposed a trust relationship between the 
tribes and the United States that has been a fundamental part of their 
relationship ever since.   
As time went by, these federal common law concepts were shaped 
by subsequent treaty developments in the nineteenth-century wars 
between the United States and Indian tribes.  In particular, with 
respect to the Sioux Tribe, the Fort Laramie Treaty of 185183 is an 
important starting point.  The treaty sought to end hostilities between 
various tribes and the United States.84  But following additional 
hostilities, the United States entered into the Fort Laramie Treaty of 
1868.85  The treaty established The Great Sioux Reservation.86  The 
reservation comprised virtually all of what is now South Dakota west of 
the Missouri River, as well as part of what is now North Dakota.87  The 
Treaty explicitly recognized a number of tribal powers, including the 
exclusive right to use reservation lands.88 
The rights under this treaty were later further modified by Con-
gress.  In the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, Congress 
 
 77. Id. at 17. 
 78. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).   
 79. Id. at 537–40.  
 80. See id. at 521. 
 81. Id. at 557 
 82. See id. 
 83. Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, etc., Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749 
[hereinafter Treaty of Fort Laramie]. 
 84.  Id. art. 1. 
 85. Treaty with the Sioux—Brule, Oglala, Minicinjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, 
Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee—and Arapaho, Apr. 29, 1869, 
15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter Treaty with the Sioux]. 
 86. Id. art. 2.  
 87. See id. (setting out the boundaries of the reservation).  
 88. Id.  
10
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provided non-Indians with fee title to some of the unallotted and 
surplus lands on the reservation.89  Then in the Act of March 2, 1889, 
Congress greatly reduced the Great Sioux Reservation, replacing it 
with smaller reservations.90  The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, 
located in north-central South Dakota, was the largest of these smaller 
reservations with boundaries established by the Act that encompassed 
2.9 million acres.91  With the Act of May 29, 1908, Congress further 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to open 1.6 million acres of 
the reservation to homesteading and settlement by non-Indians.92  As 
a result of these (and subsequent) actions by Congress, some of the 
land within the Reservation boundaries is owned by the Tribe and its 
members; some is owned by non-members. 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 allowed officially recog-
nized tribes to form their own constitutions and governments.93  The 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, in turn, established tribal bylaws that 
provided for a tribal court with the power to preside over civil and 
petty offenses pertaining to all tribal members.94  Similarly, the 
Constitution of the Cheyenne River Sioux provides tribal courts the 
authority to adjudicate claims or disputes arising among or affecting 
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.95  The Tribe’s provisions for its 
courts, nevertheless, do not answer the question of whether those 
courts have any authority over non-members. 
Two cases, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe96 and United States v. 
Wheeler,97 foreshadowed the eventual development of the Montana 
rule in 1981.  Oliphant involved a challenge by a non-Indian against a 
tribe attempting to subject him to criminal liability in tribal court.98  
The Court ultimately concluded in Oliphant that tribes lack the power 
to try non-Indians for crimes.99  Wheeler held that tribes retain that 
 
 89. See Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389–90 (1887). 
 90. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888, 888–89 (1889).   
 91. Dan Barry, A Rising but Doubted Dream on a Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 
2009, at A10 (stating that reservation consists of 2.9 million acres). 
 92. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460, 460–462 (1908).   
 93. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 38 Stat. 984, 984 (codified as amended at 
25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1988)). 
 94. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE, art. IV, § 1, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/cheyennesioux_const.htm. 
 95. Id. 
 96.  435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 97.  435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
 98. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194–95. 
 99. Id. at 211. 
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power to punish member offenders.100  Wheeler states that tribal 
members are subject to “inherent powers of limited sovereignty that 
have never been extinguished.”101  Where not withdrawn by treaty or 
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent 
status, tribes retain certain sovereign powers.102  The precise scope of 
those retained powers, though, remained undefined.   
B. Montana 
When discussion turns to the reach and confines of tribal juris-
diction over non-members, arguably, no single case has had more 
impact on this area of the law than Montana v. United States,103 and for 
good reason.  Montana was and remains the first and perhaps most 
general expression by the Supreme Court of the bounds of tribal 
jurisdiction over non-members.  Building upon Oliphant,104 a decision 
which foreclosed the possibility of tribal court jurisdiction over non-
Indians in criminal cases, the Montana court articulated the now oft-
quoted general rule that the “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian 
tribe do not extend to the activities of non-members of the tribe” 
except under the circumstances of two very narrow exceptions.105 
In Montana, the Court was called upon to decide whether the 
Crow Tribe and the United States as Trustee for the Tribe had sole 
authority to regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation, 
particularly within the Big Horn River, or whether the State of 
Montana had the authority to do so.106  By tribal regulation, the Crow 
Tribe of Montana had sought to prohibit hunting and fishing within 
its reservation by anyone who was not a member of the tribe.107  After 
examining various treaties between the United States and the Tribe 
and other materials, the Court determined that title to the riverbed 
and corresponding banks passed to the State of Montana upon its 
admission into the Union.108  Although the Tribe could prohibit or 
regulate hunting or fishing by non-members on land belonging to the 
 
 100. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 (“It is undisputed that Indian tribes have power to 
enforce their criminal laws against tribe members.”). 
 101. Id. (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945) 
(emphasis in original)). 
 102. Id. at 323. 
 103. 450 U.S. 544 (1980). 
 104. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 105. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
 106. Id. at 547.   
 107. Id. at 549.   
 108. Id. at 551–57.   
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Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe, it had no 
power to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land 
owned in fee by non-members of the Tribe.109   
Importantly, in reaching this decision, the Court focused on the 
concept of “inherent sovereignty,” explaining that through their 
original incorporation into the United States as well as specific treaties 
and statutes, the Indian tribes had lost many of the attributes of 
sovereignty, particularly as to the relations between a tribe and non-
members.110  The Court reasoned that exercise of tribal authority 
“beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional 
delegation.”111  Indeed, as the Court of Appeals had previously noted, 
it would defy common sense to suppose Congress would intend that 
non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal 
jurisdiction when the very purpose of allotment was elimination of 
tribal government.112  
Through this contextual lens then, it is clear that the rule set 
forth in Montana (that tribes generally lack jurisdiction over non-
members) is inextricably intertwined with the effect of the allotment 
policies, land alienation, and treaty rights tied to the use and occupa-
tion of lands inside a reservation.113  Taken to its logical end, the 
theory of inherent sovereignty (or its corollary principle, implied 
divestiture) necessarily means that once a tribe divests ownership of a 
piece of land (either through allotment or otherwise), it no longer 
retains the power to regulate non-member conduct on the land.  
Accordingly, to determine tribal jurisdiction over a non-member, the 
analysis must first begin with a determination of land ownership.  
Thus, assuming the land at issue is owned by a non-member non-
Indian, the general Montana rule would apply, and the non-member 
would not be subject to tribal jurisdiction except under two circums-
tances.   
The first exception, commonly referred to as the “consensual 
relationship” exception, provides that “[a] tribe may regulate, 
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-
members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
 
 109. Id. at 557–67.   
 110. Id. at 564.   
 111. Id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)). 
 112. Id. at 559 n.9. 
 113. Id. at 559–65.   
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members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.”114  In creating this exception, the Court reasoned that 
tribes still retained some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-members, 
even on non-Indian land.115   
Similarly, for the second exception, the Court concluded that 
tribes necessarily retained inherent powers to exercise civil authority 
over the conduct of non-Indians “when that conduct threatens or has 
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health or welfare of the tribe.”116   
Viewed from any angle, the “general rule” precluding tribal juris-
diction over non-members is broad and the land ownership compo-
nent is critical.  Since deciding Montana, the absence of tribal 
ownership over non-member lands inside a reservation “has been 
virtually conclusive of the absence of tribal civil jurisdiction” over a 
non-member.117  With one minor exception (a zoning case),118 the 
Supreme Court has never upheld, under Montana, the extension of 
tribal civil authority over non-members on non-Indian fee land inside 
a reservation.119  Through examination of the principles outlined by 
the Supreme Court in Montana, it becomes readily apparent that the 
exceptions for cases involving non-member conduct on non-Indian-
owned land inside a reservation are rather limited.  
C. Post-Montana 
Since deciding Montana, the Supreme Court has, from time to 
time, been called upon to analyze the scope of tribal jurisdiction over 
non-members.  While some commentators believe the Court has 
continued to refine the Montana analysis since deciding the case 
nearly thirty years ago, others believe that subsequent decisions have 
led to further erosion of tribal autonomy which began over two-
hundred years ago.  We will not debate these principles here, but 
rather recognize that a dichotomy of opinions on the topic exists.  A 
fair and perhaps neutral observation of this evolving area of the law 
would be that, at the very least, in decisions following Montana, the 
Supreme Court has put a finer point on the confines of tribal 
 
 114. Id. at 565 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).    
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 566.   
 117. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001). 
 118. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408 (1989). 
 119. Id.     
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jurisdiction over non-member activities on non-Indian land inside a 
reservation than first announced in Montana.   
 In National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians,120 a 
case involving a school district and its insurer seeking to prevent an 
injured schoolboy from executing a default judgment against the 
school district, the Court considered the potential for tribal civil 
adjudicatory authority over a non-consenting non-member.  Ultimate-
ly, the case was resolved through application of the exhaustion-of-
tribal-remedies doctrine.  The Court characterized the civil adjudica-
tory question as supporting Congress’s commitment to a policy of 
tribal self-government and self-determination.121  The Court held that, 
in order to determine a tribal court’s jurisdiction, tribal sovereignty 
must be examined, including “the extent to which that sovereignty 
has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of 
relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and 
elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.”122   
Later, in South Dakota v. Bourland,123 the Court defined the scope 
of rights enjoyed by Indian tribes, which it first alluded to in Montana.  
Specifically, the Court determined that the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe had given up, by operation of the General Allotment Act of 
1887, the Act of 1889, and the Act of 1908, its right to regulate non-
members on non-Indian-owned land inside the reservation.124  The 
Court reasoned that when a tribe or Congress conveys ownership of 
tribal lands to non-Indians, the tribe loses the right of absolute and 
exclusive use and occupation of these lands.125  According to the 
Court, “[t]he abrogation of this greater right . . . implies the loss of 
regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others.”126  In other 
words, “the power to regulate is of diminished practical use if it does 
not include the power to exclude: Regulatory authority goes hand in 
hand with the power to exclude.”127 
Following Montana and Bourland, the Court seemingly clarified 
the intended narrowness of both exceptions in Strate v. A-1 Contrac-
tors.128 In Strate, a highway traffic accident occurred on the right-of-way 
 
 120. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).  
 121. Id. at 856. 
 122. Id. at 855–56.    
 123. 508 U.S. 679 (1993). 
 124. Id. at 688.   
 125. Id.   
 126. Id. at 689.    
 127. Id. at 691 n.11. 
 128. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).   
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owned by North Dakota, but inside the reservation.129  A driver, his 
employer, the employer’s insurer, and the tribal court sought a 
declaratory judgment that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate claims of a non-Indian driver (the widow of a tribal 
member and mother of tribal members) for injuries arising out of an 
automobile accident on a state highway that ran through reservation 
land.130  The Court held that when the accident occurred on a portion 
of a public highway maintained by the state under a federally granted 
right-of-way over Indian reservation land, tribal courts could not 
entertain a civil action against the allegedly negligent driver or the 
driver’s employer, neither of whom was a member of the tribe.131  It 
was held that absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern 
the conduct of non-members on the highway in question, the court 
would not have jurisdiction.132  The Court determined this piece of 
land to be the equivalent of the alienated, non-Indian lands at issue in 
Montana, Brendale, and Bourland.133  For that reason, the Court found 
that the case fit within the general rule announced in Montana, 
declaring that tribes lack authority to regulate or adjudicate the 
conduct of non-members on non-Indian land inside a reservation 
absent one of two exceptions.134  
The Strate decision is important for two reasons.  First, with re-
gard to the “consensual relationship” exception, the Court provided 
litigants with an outer boundary for determining whether a pre-
existing relationship between a non-member and member falls within 
the “consensual relationship” exception.135  Strate involved an 
automobile accident where the driver was on alienated land inside a 
reservation as a result of his company contracting with the tribe to 
perform various work inside the reservation.136  The Court concluded 
this was not enough to satisfy the consensual relationship exception 
because the automobile accident was itself too attenuated from or 
beyond the scope of whatever consensual relationship existed 
between the driver, his employer, and the tribe.137 
Similarly, with respect to the second Montana exception concern-
 
 129. Id. at 454–55. 
 130. Id. at 438. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 440. 
 134. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–65 (1980). 
 135. Strate, 520 U.S. at 440. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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ing conduct that threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe, 
the Court concluded that the seminal question is whether a State’s or 
Territory’s exercise of authority would trench unduly on tribal self-
government.138  The Court quickly concluded that this exception was 
not invoked in a pedestrian automobile accident.139  Furthermore, the 
Court rejected the argument that Montana’s general rule against tribal 
authority over non-members applied only to regulatory (as opposed to 
adjudicatory) authority, holding that a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction 
does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.140   
Following Strate, the Court elaborated upon the “consensual rela-
tionship” exception in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley.141  In Atkinson, 
the Court concluded that the Navajo Nation could not tax non-tribal 
member guests of a hotel located on non-Indian fee land within the 
reservation.142  In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the principles 
underlying the general rule precluding tribal jurisdiction over non-
members, that “Indian tribes are ‘unique aggregations possessing 
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,’ 
but their dependent status generally precludes extension of tribal 
civil-authority beyond these limits.”143  The Court rejected the Navajo 
Nation’s contention that a consensual relationship existed between 
the guest and the Tribe based on the guest’s acceptance of benefits 
from services potentially rendered by the Tribe.144  Rather, the Court 
found that receipt of such services did not satisfy the requisite 
relationship prong of the first exception.145  According to the Court, if 
that were the case, the exception would swallow the rule as all non-
Indian fee lands within a reservation benefit, to some extent, from the 
advantages of a civilized society offered by the Indian tribe.146   
In contrast to the developed body of case law regarding the first 
Montana exception, there is no comparable line of cases for the 
second Montana or “adjudicatory” exception.  Since articulating the 
second exception in 1981, the Court has never applied it to find that a 
tribe had civil adjudicatory authority jurisdiction over a non-member 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.    
 141. 532 U.S. 645, 656–57 (2001).   
 142. Id. at 659. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 654.   
 145. Id. at 655. 
 146. Id.   
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defendant.  At present, it merely remains an unrealized possibility.   
IV. THE PLAINS COMMERCE BANK OPINION 
For nearly eight years after deciding Hicks and Atkinson, the Su-
preme Court left open the question whether a commercial business 
relationship between a non-Indian owning fee land and a tribal 
member would allow the tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
non-member as an “other means” of regulating its conduct under the 
Montana “consensual relationship” exception.  In a 5–4 majority 
decision in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., the 
Supreme Court answered this question in the negative, upholding 
thirty years of precedent.147  
To say the facts of Plains Commerce Bank presented the Court with 
a clear-cut answer under Montana and its progeny would be a gross 
overstatement.  The lending relationship between the parties had 
become convoluted over time and the trial and appellate records 
facing the Court were anything but clear.148  Moreover, from a policy 
perspective, implications of the Court’s decision would be far 
reaching regardless of the outcome.   
The Court quickly disposed of arguments that the Bank lacked 
standing to bring the appeal,149 or that a relatively pedestrian com-
mercial lending relationship between the Bank and a South Dakota 
corporation somehow invoked tribal welfare or political and econom-
ic interests of the “catastrophic” magnitude sufficient to invoke the 
second Montana “civil adjudication” exception.150  The Court focused 
its analysis on the Montana general rule and the first or “consensual 
relationship” exception, and this is where we will focus our analysis.151 
The linchpin of the Court’s decision is remarkably simple: the 
first Montana exception contemplates regulation of conduct of a non-
member, but said conduct does not include the non-Indian to non-
Indian sale of already non-Indian-owned fee land.152  This distinction 
can only fully be understood by going back to the very roots of over 
two hundred years of American jurisprudence concerning relations 
between the United States and the Indian tribes.   
In deciding Montana and subsequent “first exception cases,” the 
 
 147. 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2723–26 (2008). 
 148. Id. at 2715–16.  
 149. Id. at 2716–18. 
 150. Id. at 2726–27. 
 151. Id. at 2721–26. 
 152. Id. at 2723. 
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Court has adhered unwaveringly to the concept of implied divestiture, 
a concept grounded in the allotment acts enacted by Congress during 
the formative years of this country, as discussed above.153  Tribes are, 
in essence, nations within a nation, a relationship unlike that of any 
other.154  By virtue of this “reduced” status, they possess sovereignty 
only to the extent necessary to protect the political integrity, health, 
and welfare of their members.155  This is where their sovereignty 
ends.156  As a result, courts have allowed regulation of non-member 
conduct on fee land only in cases that “flow directly from these 
limited sovereign interests.”157  In Duro v. Reina,158 for example, the 
Court found that the tribes retained power to exclude persons from 
tribal land, and gave tribes the power to set conditions on entry to 
that land via licensing requirements and hunting regulation.159 
Similarly, the tribe’s power to tax certain items is retained “insofar as 
taxation enables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential 
services.”160   
Regulation of the sale of non-Indian fee land is nothing of the 
kind.  Unlike the aforementioned types of regulation, it cannot be 
justified by mere reference to the tribe’s remaining sovereign 
interests.  As articulated by the Court, “[b]y definition, fee land 
owned by non-members has already been removed from the tribe’s 
immediate control.”161  Thus, tribes “cannot justify regulation of such 
land’s sale by reference to its power to superintend tribal land, then, 
because non-Indian fee parcels have ceased to be tribal land.”162  Tribal 
retained interests in protecting internal relations and self-government 
with respect to regulation of non-member owned fee land is necessari-
ly unavailing for the same reason. 
In Plains Commerce Bank, the Court put a fine point on what it 
considered to be regulation beyond the inherent retained powers of 
tribes.163  However, it left open the possibility that certain uses by non-
members of non-Indian-owned fee land may be regulated by the Tribe 
if said uses were noxious or otherwise threatened tribal welfare or 
 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 2718.    
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2718–19.   
 157. Id. at 2723.   
 158. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
 159. Id. at 687.   
 160. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2723. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. at 2724, 2728. 
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security.164  Such regulation, though, was only allowed to the extent 
necessary to curb non-member activities relating to use of the land, 
not the mere act of its resale, which, in this case, respondents alleged 
gave rise to the tribal discrimination claim at issue.165   
Needless to say, the dissenting Justices saw things differently.  
Justice Ginsberg filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer.166  In its scintillating opinion, the dissent charged 
the majority with having failed to follow the principles espoused in 
Montana and subsequent decisions by creating an artificial distinction 
between the sale of non-Indian fee land and other types of regulation 
presumably allowed under the plain language of the first Montana 
exception—for example, regulation of “commercial dealing, con-
tracts, [and] leases,” a result the dissent found “perplexing.”167  Given 
inclusion of the word “lease” within the language of the first Montana 
exception, the dissent posed the question “why should a non-
member’s lease of fee land to a member be differentiated, for 
Montana exception purposes, from a sale of the same land?”168  The 
answer is “implied divestiture,” and the analysis, going back to 
Montana, begins with the ownership of the land. 
To begin with, reservation land leased by a tribal member to a 
non-member is of a different character than that of non-Indian fee 
land, the latter type having already been alienated by the tribe.  
Bourland and Strate teach that under the notion of implied divestiture, 
the tribe no longer possesses (or possesses to a much lesser extent) 
the ability to regulate the non-Indian fee land.169  Thus, as the 
argument goes, once the tribe (or Congress) permits the sale of the 
land to a non-Indian, the tribe necessarily divests itself of its inherent 
sovereign power to regulate the non-member’s sale of the land.  
Regulation of a non-Indian land sale is beyond the inherent powers 
retained by the tribe to provide for the political integrity, welfare, 
health, or governance of the internal relations of its members.170 
The analysis then proceeds to look at the “consensual relation-
ship” at issue, which Strate and Atkinson have taught is not all encom-
 
 164. Id. at 2724.   
 165. Id. at 2725. 
 166. Id. at 2727. 
 167. Id. at 2730 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 168. Id.   
 169. Id. at 2719–20 (majority opinion).   
 170. Id. at 2723–24. 
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passing.171  Stated succinctly, a relationship between a tribe and 
member giving rise to tribal regulation over the non-member’s 
conduct in one area does not necessarily mean that the tribe can 
regulate all other areas of conduct.  It is not “in for a penny, in for a 
pound.”172  In Plains Commerce Bank, the Court noted that the com-
mercial lending relationship and contractual claims between the Bank 
and petitioners were not at issue.173   
The key to the Court’s analysis was recognizing that that Longs 
were attempting to “re-characterize their claim as turning on the 
bank’s alleged failure to pay to respondents loans promised for cattle-
raising on tribal trust land” when, in fact, “the Longs brought their 
discrimination claim seeking to have the land sales set aside on the 
ground that the sale to non-members ‘on terms more favorable’ than 
the bank had extended to the Longs” violated tribal tort law.174  In 
essence, the Longs’ discrimination claim “challenge[d] a non-Indian’s 
sale of non-Indian fee land” and the tribal tort law the Longs at-
tempted to enforce, according to the Court, “acted as a restraint on 
alienation.”175  This distinction is important, because, as the Court 
noted, “Montana does not permit Indian tribes to regulate the sale of 
non-Indian fee land.  Montana and its progeny permit tribal regula-
tion of nonmember conduct inside the reservation that implicates the 
tribe’s sovereign interests.”176 
The reasoning underpinning this fine distinction can perhaps 
best be understood by keeping in mind the limited purpose of the two 
Montana exceptions, which is to allow tribes to regulate non-members 
only to the extent necessary to “protect tribal self-government [and] to 
control internal relations.”177  Looking at the case in this way, the 
Court necessarily concluded that regulation by the tribe of a non-
Indian sale of non-Indian land was beyond the intended purpose of 
the first Montana exception.178  Following this reasoning, the Court 
determined that the characteristics of the non-Indian, non-member 
owned land precluded its sale from being a non-member activity 
subject to tribal regulation.179  Further, the Court’s opinion suggests 
 
 171. Id. at 2725. 
 172. Id. at 2724 (citation omitted).   
 173. Id. at 2720.   
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 2720–21. 
 176. Id. at 2721. 
 177. Id. (citation omitted). 
 178. Id.   
 179. Id. 
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that the tribal discrimination claim was also too attenuated from even 
the commercial lending relationship between the Bank and the Long 
Family Land and Cattle Company to have allowed the tribal court to 
exercise jurisdiction over the Bank.180  
In the final analysis, there will surely be wildly varying views on 
the current state and future direction of tribal jurisdiction.  While 
some will praise the Court’s decision as keeping in line with Montana 
and its progeny, others will surely criticize it.  One thing is for certain 
though, the Plains Commerce Bank decision provides members with a 
brighter line for determining the outer boundaries of tribal regula-
tion over non-members than ever before.  In a nutshell, tribes lack 
jurisdiction to regulate or adjudicate a non-Indian’s sale of non-
Indian fee land inside a reservation because this non-member activity 
is beyond the intended purpose and scope of the Montana exceptions, 
which only permit tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-members on 
non-Indian lands inside a reservation to the extent necessary to 
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.  As 
discussed below, this is something from which both tribes and non-
members may one day benefit.  
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRIBAL JURISDICTION 
The road to understanding tribal jurisdiction over non-members 
arguably became a little smoother in light of the Plains Commerce Bank 
decision.  Yet, there are still potholes left to be filled.  Retired baseball 
pitcher Vernon Sanders Law is credited with saying that “experience is 
a hard teacher because she gives the test first, the lesson afterwards.”181  
If that is the case, and Plains Commerce Bank was the “test,” what lessons 
have we learned?   
First and foremost, inclusion of choice of forum and law provi-
sions in the lending agreement between the Bank and the Long 
Family Land & Cattle Co. might have negated the entire lawsuit 
altogether.  Though the contract was not directly at issue in the 
appeal, one must wonder what would have happened had the loan 
agreement between the parties contained language similar to the 
following: “any and all disputes arising from or relating to this 
agreement shall be heard in South Dakota Court and be governed by 
South Dakota law.”  Indeed, the case may very well have never wound 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, UNCOMMON SENSE: THE WORLD’S FULLEST COMPENDIUM OF 
WISDOM 118 (1987).   
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up before the Supreme Court as the parties’ intent regarding 
jurisdiction over claims arising from or relating to the lending 
relationship would have been clear from the outset.  Of course, there 
is no guarantee inclusion of this language would have avoided 
litigation altogether, or that it would have precluded the tribal courts 
from hearing the case in the first instance.   
But supposing the parties’ agreement did contain South Dakota 
choice of law and forum selection clauses, would the parties have 
needed to litigate the matter to finality in tribal court before the Bank 
could seek an injunction in federal court by raising jurisdictional 
arguments?  The answer is probably “no.”  National Farmers Union v. 
Crow Tribe of Indians, an exhaustion case, teaches that as a general 
proposition, a tribal court should be afforded the opportunity in the 
first instance to carefully examine whether it has the power to exercise 
civil subject matter jurisdiction over non-Indians.182  The caveat to this 
proposition is that exhaustion is not required where assertion of tribal 
jurisdiction “is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad 
faith, or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional 
prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack 
of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.”183   
An agreement between parties containing forum and choice of 
law provisions other than tribal court would seemingly negate the 
parties’ need to litigate the matter in tribal court in the first instance.  
Under those circumstances, a credible argument could be made that 
the party seeking to have the matter heard in tribal court acted in bad 
faith by disregarding the plain language of the agreement.  Moreover, 
it could be argued that the choice of law and forum selection clauses 
operate as a “jurisdictional prohibition” under the caveat to the 
exhaustion principle set forth in National Farmers Union.   
The issue of consent to tribal court jurisdiction is arguably no 
clearer following the Plains Commerce Bank decision.  The Court’s 
analysis suggests that if a non-member were to explicitly consent to 
tribal court jurisdiction, as in the case of a contractual choice of 
forum clause, then perhaps the tribal court would have jurisdiction.  
Much less clear, however, is whether it would be possible for a non-
member to implicitly consent to tribal court jurisdiction.   
One potential route for such consent might be through conduct.  
There is a suggestion in the Plains Commerce Bank opinion that if 
 
 182. 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).   
 183. Id. at 857 n.21.    
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conduct showing implicit consent to tribal court jurisdiction was 
sufficiently connected to the consensual relationship contemplated by 
the first Montana exception, then perhaps there would be jurisdiction.  
But the Court has never held that.  Indeed, the Plains Commerce Bank 
opinion addressed the absence of jurisdiction in the reverse situation: 
conduct where the tribe sought to attach jurisdiction that was 
unrelated to the contract between the parties.  Strate and Plains 
Commerce Bank could be read together to support the conclusion that 
a non-member’s consent to tribal court adjudication of a dispute 
should be actual and clear.   
Problems remain, however, for a non-member defendant whoa 
finds himself defending a lawsuit in tribal court.  For example, The 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not apply to Indian 
tribes.184  And the handful of analogous safeguards enforceable in 
tribal court under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968185 are not 
identical.186  The presumption against tribal-court civil jurisdiction 
therefore squares with one of the principal policy considerations 
underlying Oliphant: an overriding concern that non-member citizens 
be “protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal 
liberty.”187    
But it must not be forgotten that tribes do not possess sovereignty 
comparable to that of a foreign country; they are not an equal partner 
in the scheme of federalism.  The Supreme Court can review federal 
court decisions.  Courts in the state system are both potentially subject 
to review by the Supreme Court and operate subject to a qualified 
right of removal to federal courts.  The tribal court system, however, is 
separate and unique.  It is wholly distinct from traditional courts of 
general jurisdiction.  Other than jurisdictional questions, federal 
courts provide no substantive review of tribal court proceedings.  
Thus, the tribal court system lacks adequate structural protections 
against abridging non-member defendants’ constitutional rights.  For 
this reason, tribal courts’ power to adjudicate members’ claims against 
non-members should be constrained.  To this point, the Supreme 
Court has denied tribal courts broad jurisdiction over non-member 
defendants who stand outside members’ political relationships to 
their tribes.   
 
 184. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).   
 185. 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 
 186. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978)). 
 187. Id. (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210). 
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At present, tribal courts still lack an important safeguard that 
exists in the federal system with respect to state court jurisdiction.  
Congress has explicitly provided for a statutory right of removal from 
state court based on either federal-question jurisdiction or diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction.188  To date, Congress has not provided for a 
right of removal from tribal court to federal court, though it could 
presumably do so.  If a right to removal existed that allowed non-
member defendants to remove cases from tribal court to federal 
court, there would at least be a procedural safeguard against the 
imposition of tribal court jurisdiction over a non-member defendant’s 
objection.   
As it stands now, however, a non-member defendant in tribal 
court who wishes to challenge that jurisdiction must first arguably 
exhaust tribal court remedies.  Upon then bringing a jurisdictional 
challenge in federal court, the non-member defendant may only seek 
review of the jurisdictional question, not the underlying merits.  
Providing a right of removal or providing a means for review of the 
merits on proper appeal from tribal court would represent a step 
toward a fairer and more uniform system.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Plains Commerce Bank opinion represents the most recent 
development in a long line of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
defining the scope of tribal sovereignty.  Although it does not 
definitively answer the question of whether a tribal court could have 
jurisdiction over a non-member defendant, it seemingly makes the 
barriers to that more formidable without outright prohibiting the 
possibility.  The opinion appears to narrow the Montana exceptions by 
interpreting them with language that tends toward a more limited 
reading of the text of the exceptions.  By doing so, the Plains opinion 
necessarily strengthens the general rule from Montana that tribes 
generally lack authority over non-members.   
Though the Supreme Court left open, for now, the ultimate 
question as to whether tribes have jurisdiction over non-member 
defendants, continued economic interaction between tribes and non-
members almost assures that the Court will find itself required to 
answer this question in the near future.   
 
 
 188. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32 (2008); 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2008). 
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